

A Study of Advantages by Mediation in Armed Conflicts

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ABSTRACT

Advantages of mediation in armed conflicts are generally welcomed by practitioners and researchers. This research will help to spread the advantages of Mediation in armed conflicts at worldwide. This research will strengthen the U.N.O efforts to restore peace and prosperity in the world. The research will initiate the arms conflicted groups for mediation.

Keywords: Advantages, Mediation, Bias, Peace, Intervention

INTRODUCTION

Mediation has proven to be one of the most effective methods of resolving armed conflicts or disputes.

In the mediation parties meet the neutral mediator who is usually specially trained in conflict resolution.

The mediator works with the parties to facilitate resolution of the issues in dispute.

International efforts to mediate armed conflicts have become common, a trend generally welcomed by practitioners and researchers. Mediation is, by most accounts "By far the common form of peaceful third party intervention in armed conflicts. Third party intervention has increased significantly with last two decades.

It is the most commonly used technique of intervention to come to an end of armed conflicts. To make mediation even more prevalent, the United Nations has established a dedicated mediation support unit in 2006 and a mediation support stand by team.

Most researchers agree that the ascent of mediation as a technique of choice for the third parties hoping to settle armed conflicts has become a success story.

Mediation has helped to decrease the number of armed conflicts.

Mediation has emerged as consistently effective in both preventing escalation and promoting peaceful settlements. In fact mediation is more effective tool of settlement than any other type of third party intervention.

Interpretation :

For an effective mediation and to get advantages in the armed conflicts the mediator should be impartial, honest and having sound understanding about the conflict. If mediator blames for bias then the mediation process becomes notorious. A successful mediation gives many advantages.

There are many advantages to participating a mediation including those listed below:-

1. It helps to bring normalcy into the conflicted groups.
2. It increases disarmament.
3. By mediation to reach at the settlement logic plays game in place of power in conflicted groups.
4. It is a safety tool comparatively weak groups involved in armed conflicts.
5. Mediation promotes peace and prosperity in the world.
6. It is helpful to achieve the United Nations goal for peaceful world.
7. Mediation changes the utilisation of the armed conflicted groups energy and resources in welfare jobs.
8. Mediation can save the people from disease and poverty of the armed conflicted region.
9. Mediation can save the life of people.
10. It is a positive activity
11. Mediation helps in relay exchange and acquisition of information between the disputations .
12. Mediators can manage information by preventing or screening communication between disputants.
13. Mediators can recommend concessions, moderate extreme demands and propose possible settlements.
14. Mediators convince disputants to adjust expectations.
15. Unbiased mediations are relatively effective in armed conflicts.
16. Disputant is more likely to agree a concession suggested by unbiased mediator especially in the case of armed conflicts.
17. IGAD (Inter Governmental Authority on Development) mediation ended the Sudan's civil war in 2005.
18. The Soviet Union facilitated an agreement between India and Pakistan in 1966 at Tashkent.
19. Mediation decides justice in the dispute.

Mediation is always less expensive comparatively to going in armed conflict.

20. Mediation is private and can take place in a comfortable and non- adversarial setting.
21. Mediation can be scheduled at a date and time that is convenient for all parties.
22. Settling conflict at mediation can allow parties to avoid the stress and anxiety.
23. Mediation allows the parties to realise some control over the outcome of their conflict.
24. Studies show that parties are generally more satisfied in the long term when they have input how their dispute is resolved.
25. The cooperative nature of mediated settlement tends to reduce hostility between the parties.
26. When the parties go to armed conflicts they often feel that they are in win-loss situation.
27. Mediation provides the parties with a greater level of confidentiality.

II.EXAMPLE

1.Anglo-American Involvement in the Trieste Negotiations, 1954

What about cases in which biased mediation was supposedly successful? One explanation is that disputants' expectations did not need to change in order for an agreement to emerge. See Danforth's first report to President Bush on the situation in Sudan (Danforth, 2002), in which he notes his consultations with the Vatican and the Archbishop of Canterbury and describes an "open air Episcopal service near a bombed out church" in Sudan's south as one of the "most memorable experiences" of his visits to Sudan. On the American approach to Sudan, see also Woodward (2006). The Department of State's list of state sponsors of terrorism is available at [http://www.state.gov/s/terrorism/](#). Sudan received this designation in August 1993. The protocol stated that "nationally enacted legislation having effect only in respect of the states outside Southern Sudan shall have as its source of legislation Sharia and the consensus of the people".

Agreement to emerge in these cases. A biased mediator can be effective in helping the disputants coordinate on a settlement, provided the disputants' reservation values form a bargaining range of potential agreements even before mediation begins. As long as any alternatives to conflict resolution are sufficiently costly, the disputants can accept a settlement proposal even if the mediator is biased.

The case of Anglo-American mediation between Italy and Yugoslavia over Trieste in 1954 is one such case, and one that has been cited as an example of the effectiveness of biased mediation. British and American mediators were biased towards Italy, a Cold War ally for whom the UK and the US had administered the northern part of the disputed territory around Trieste. But mediation did not need to change beliefs on either side in order to be effective. Both Italy and Yugoslavia already understood that the post-WWII demarcation line separating Anglo-American forces in Zone A from Yugoslav-controlled Zone B constituted an acceptable bargaining solution, despite the fact that Yugoslav delegates publicly protested American and British intentions to hand control over the northern Trieste area to Italy. As the British negotiator Sir Geoffrey Harrison put it: "They both claimed to have rights to more territory. They both knew they could not get it. They both realized that the best they could hope to get was Zone A and Zone B, respectively". Yet another alternative reading of the case is that the UK and the US had moderated their bias toward Italy by the time the status of Trieste was negotiated in 1954, as the Western powers aimed to improve relations with Yugoslavia following Tito's split with the Soviet Union. But while the British and American governments "adopted a more neutral position",²⁸ they did not embrace impartiality. The US negotiator and architect of the 1954 settlement, Llewellyn E. Thompson, recalls that "I suppose the fact that we were on the spot and were occupying and administering Zone A made us somewhat partisan, which in a sense we were.... We realized that the Italians were our allies". But either way, it was not Anglo-American bias toward Italy that settled the dispute, but the fact that expectations and beliefs on both sides permitted an acceptable agreement from the get-go. The mediators in this case did not need to convince either side that the situation was significantly different from what they believed it to be. Hence a range of mediators, both biased and unbiased, could have proposed an acceptable division of the territory.

2. Algeria's Mediation in the Iranian Hostage Crisis

A similarly acceptable bargaining solution already existed in the Iranian hostage crisis when Algeria offered to mediate, another mediation effort cited in support of the notion that biased interventions work agreement to emerge in these cases. A biased mediator can be effective in helping

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From the above discussion, we reached the conclusion that to promote peace and prosperity in the world mediation is the need of time in armed conflicts. The U.N.O as well as the governments of its members nations should encourage the mediation units. The U.N.O should suggest mediation as a wide topic in the curriculum of school as well as college students. In the case of civil wars, armed conflicts are the result of mismanagement by the state. This article has two core goals: first, it provided a overview of a theoretical argument that links the initiation of mediation to its implementation in order to suggest that one cannot be comprehensively understood

without an account of another. Mediator unbiased is one important characteristic that affects the decision of disputants. I argued impartial mediators are relatively more likely to produce settlements. The second goal of this article is to convince readers that biased mediators are relatively ineffective.

Mediation should start as early as possible in the case of armed conflicts and many times for its avoidance to start too. As Sudan's civil war was ended after 22 years through mediation. The loss made that time in war cannot be compensated by anyone.

We should promote unbiased mediation for its credibility, popularity and success. Although disputants want to avoid costly armed conflicts but they were in need of mediator for its settlement.

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